Emerging technologies are changing maritime logistics from a movement-of-goods problem into a data, access, and dependency problem. Across the sector, new systems are being adopted to improve visibility, routing, cargo handling, compliance, and operational coordination. These technologies can make maritime supply chains more efficient, while also becoming assets that threat actors may target.
Maritime logistics technologies are part of the security environment because they move, process, and expose data tied to cargo flows, port activity, vessel movements, and critical supply-chain dependencies in both commercial and military operations. They introduce three issues maritime leaders need to understand: efficiencies, vulnerabilities, and dependencies.
New efficiencies
Emerging technologies are attractive in maritime logistics because they address operational problems. AI-enabled routing tools can improve route selection, arrival estimates, and congestion response. Digital cargo platforms improve visibility across shippers, carriers, freight forwarders, ports, and customs authorities. Automated cranes, connected port equipment, and inspection technologies can increase throughput and improve cargo assurance. These efficiencies create value, but they also make the underlying systems worth targeting.
New vulnerabilities
Vulnerabilities in maritime emerging technologies are weaknesses that a threat actor could exploit to access, disrupt, manipulate, or collect information from a technology asset. Relevant threat actors may include state-linked actors, criminal networks, commercial competitors, violent extremist organizations, or maritime criminal groups seeking operational or strategic advantage.
The asset is not only a vessel, port, or piece of physical infrastructure. The asset can also be the routing software, cargo data platform, port operating system, automated crane, inspection system, sensor network, satellite link, vendor access portal, or data environment connected to maritime operations.
A threat actor does not need to destroy a system for the system to become useful. They may only need to observe it, access its data, manipulate its inputs, disrupt its availability, or use it to understand how the wider supply chain functions.
New dependencies
Dependencies can be technical, including cloud hosting, satellite communications, Global Positioning System/Global Navigation Satellite System (GPS/GNSS) data, Automatic Identification System (AIS) data, software updates, application programming interfaces (APIs), sensors, remote maintenance tools, and vendor-managed systems. They can also be commercial or geopolitical, including foreign-manufactured equipment, proprietary software, single-vendor platforms, third-party data providers, foreign logistics networks, or remotely serviced hardware.
These dependencies matter because they can become targetable assets. A port, carrier, or government customer may adopt a technology for efficiency, then become reliant on a vendor, data stream, software environment, or communications link that is difficult to replace, audit, or operate independently.
Modern maritime logistics requires vendors, software, sensors, and communications networks. Maritime leaders need to understand what they depend on, who controls it, who can access it, and what happens if the system is unavailable, compromised, or manipulated.
Case Study: Dual-use Emerging Technology in Maritime Logistics – Artificial Intelligence-enabled Logistics Routing
AI-enabled logistics routing is a software layer that uses maritime data to support routing, scheduling, estimated time of arrival, port-call planning, and cargo movement decisions. The system may draw from AIS, GPS/GNSS, Electronic Chart Display and Information System (ECDIS) outputs, weather data, port-call data, berth windows, customs records, cargo documentation, carrier schedules, terminal operating systems, and customer or supplier data. It improves efficiency by reducing idle times, improving arrival times, and flagging route, port, or cargo-movement risks earlier.1
Data aggregation creates exposure. A routing platform may collect vessel movements, cargo timing, port dependencies, customer relationships, supplier networks, recurring routes, preferred carriers, and delivery priorities. That information has commercial value and often intelligence value. A threat actor with access to the platform may be able to map how a maritime supply chain functions, which nodes are critical, and where delays or interdiction would have the greatest effect.
Input integrity is the second potential vulnerability. AIS and GPS data support maritime navigation and routing, and both can be unreliable under adversarial conditions. The U.S. Government Accountability Office states that GPS signals are low-power and vulnerable to interference, and that the lack of a capability to prevent GPS manipulation leaves the system vulnerable to inauthentic GPS signals.2
The dependency issue is visible in official warnings about logistics platforms and port equipment. The Maritime Administration’s (MARAD) 2025 advisory describes one such platform, LOGINK, as a single-window logistics management platform that aggregates data from domestic and foreign ports, logistics networks, shippers, shipping companies, public databases, and users in China. MARAD states that at least 24 global ports have cooperation agreements with LOGINK and that the platform can collect sensitive business and foreign government data, including corporate registry and vessel and cargo data.3
Due Diligence
Due diligence helps founders, investors, and government procurement teams understand the risk calculus of emerging technologies. It involves asking:
- How does this asset improve commercial or security operations?
- What attack surfaces does the technology expose?
- How could a threat actor target or manipulate this technology?
- What dependencies does this technology create?
The goal is to understand which maritime technologies become targetable once they are connected, trusted, and deployed.
References
1. Roberts, Adarryl. “Utilization of Artificial Intelligence (AI) to Illuminate Supply Chain Risk.” Defense Logistics Agency, May 1, 2025. https://www.dla.mil/About-DLA/News/News-Article-View/Article/4186367/utilization-of-artificial-intelligence-ai-to-illuminate-supply-chain-risk/.
2. U.S. Government Accountability Office. Coast Guard: Additional Efforts Needed to Address Cybersecurity Risks to the Maritime Transportation System. GAO-25-107244, Feb. 11, 2025. https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-25-107244.pdf.
3. U.S. Maritime Administration. 2025-006: Worldwide Foreign Adversarial Technological, Physical, and Cyber Influence. U.S. Department of Transportation, Apr. 9, 2025. https://www.maritime.dot.gov/msci/2025-006-worldwide-foreign-adversarial-technological-physical-and-cyber-influence.
